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Table: Hypotheses - Effects of decision
systems on performance and other incentive mechanisms in corporate
governance Click here to see an exhibition on these issues and their relation to other hypotheses in corporate governance. |
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5) From decision system
to financial performance |
5A: The separation of control between a team of
executives and a board of directors may increase financial performance by
mitigating the possibility of self-dealing among the firms’ top management (Fama and Jensen [1983a,
1983b]). More
information. |
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14A: The presence of an independent remuneration committee in the board of directors may help to improve the efficiency of the remuneration system by minimizing the risk of self-dealing among managers. |
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25A: Decisions regarding capital structure may matter because it could be used as an instrument to discipline the management. For instance, managers may prefer less leverage than the board of directors or the owners would prefer. |
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34A: The existence of differential voting rights
and staggered boards may prevent the market for corporate control from
functioning smoothly. |
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26A: The presence of an independent recruitment
committee in the board of directors may help to improve the efficiency of the
market for management services. |
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