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Table: Hypotheses - Effects of remuneration
systems on performance and other incentive mechanisms in corporate
governance Click here to see an exhibition on these issues and their relation to other hypotheses in corporate governance. |
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6) From incentive based
compensation to financial
performance |
6A: Incentive
correlation argument: Remuneration systems that correlate the
management’s salary with financial performance may motivate them to increase
financial performance (Hart and Holmström [1987, part 1]). 6B: Incentive correlation incentive crime
argument: Remuneration
systems that correlate the management’s salary with financial performance may
motivate incompetent and opportunistic managers to use their power to fake
the earnings of the firm they manage. Forging the accounts is not possible in
the long-term so although in the short-term this kind of argument should
cause managerial salary and financial performance to be positively correlated
in the long-term the effect should be highly significant and negative. The
latter is also the case because the management is assumed to be incompetent
and the longer they stay in power the more money the firm will loose.
Furthermore, it should be expected that countries that do not have a legal
system that punishes this kind of managerial fraud heavily should suffer more
from this kind of crimes. 6C: Compensation level argument:
Higher managerial compensation may result in higher financial performance
because higher wages are able to attract the most competent managers. 6D: Rent extortion argument:
All managerial compensation decreases financial performance simply because it
ceteris paribus reduces the residual
profits. Extraordinarily high managerial remuneration may therefore have a
significant and negative effect on the overall financial performance. 6E: Fat wallet no care argument: Very high levels of managerial compensation cause the managers to become too rich too fast to care about continuing to work hard to keep his/her job. |
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- Copyright 1997-2008, ViamInvest. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Legal notice. |
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