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Table: Hypotheses - Effects of creditor
structure on performance and other incentive mechanisms in corporate
governance Click here to see an exhibition on these issues and their relation to other hypotheses in corporate governance. |
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3A: Using short-term debt rather than long-term means that the capital market evaluates managers more often because of faster debt roll-over and this may increase financial performance (Shleifer and Vishny [1997, page 757]). 3B: A large creditor may press the management to pursue so safe investments that it hurts long-run profitability. More info. |
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12A: Large creditors may sit on the board of directors or otherwise influence the firm’s decision process. |
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21A: A bankrupt firm may have a better chance of being reorganized or being liquidated at fewer costs if it has a few large creditors rather than numerous of small creditors. |
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- Copyright 1997-2008, ViamInvest. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Legal notice. |
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