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Terminology: Value concepts regarding stock price
theory The terminology is used in the following exhibitions about stock price
theory
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The fundamental value of a corporation is the best
possible estimate about the present value of expected corporate income. Such
estimates are produced by fundamental values analysis. More info
here. |
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The value index measures the stock market price in terms
of fundamental corporate value. The latter
is defined as the market price that would prevail if the cost of gathering
and processing information were zero. Alternatively, the fundamental value is
the market price that would prevail if all the market participants were perfectly
informed investors. Consequently, an index value of 1.5 means that the
stock market price is 50% higher than the fundamental value of the firm. |
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When information about fundamental value is costly to obtain a certain fluctuation level or band must associate the market equilibrium price. Somewhat paradoxically, fluctuations are needed in order to motivate informed investors to prevent prices from fluctuating even more! This is very different from the perfect market economy model where information is costless so that prices do not need to fluctuate to be in equilibrium. More info here. |
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Reported book value / true book value Reported book value to true book value is an index that
measures how far away the reported book value such as equity or invested
capital is from the true book value. The true book value is defined as the
book value that could be produced if no expense was spared and if there where
no biases in the value caused by opportunistic manipulation of value or by
biasing accounting conventions. An example of an accounting convention that
bias reported book value from true book value is the treatment of marketing
and R&D expenses. Such expenses are investments because they have
positive effects on the firm's income several years after the expenses have
been made. Nevertheless, most jurisdictions require such investments to be
written of immediately at the earnings account and it will therefore not be
posted on the asset account. As a result the reported net earnings and assets
are less than the true earnings and assets. The reason for having such
law-enforced biases is usually to protect investors by limiting the number of
ways that firms can use to manipulate reported values. Despite of such
biasing-precaution-conventions there are plenty of opportunities left for
firms to manipulate the reported book values, and that they also have
incentives to do so is argued below: |
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Legally
forced valuation bands The red valuation bands indicate that there are legally
imposed limitations as to how far away the reported book value can be from
the true book value. Most accounting
jurisdictions are based on a general clause that requires the corporate
account to give a true picture of the corporate earnings, assets and
liabilities. Indeed, when the external audit firms, the board of directors,
and the top-managers sign the corporate account they are often required to
make an explicit statement saying that they sign the accounts in conviction
that they are showing a true picture of the firm's financial situation.
Everybody who knows jut a little about auditing also know that the concept of
'true accounts' is a very elastic concept because of the many alternative
ways that can be pursued to produce the accounts. It is simply too difficult
to define exactly what are the true earnings or assets. Therefore, in order
to get somebody convicted for violating the general clause the accounts have
to be grossly misleading. The exhibition show that the book values should be
overvalued by about 300% or undervalued to about 33% of the true value before
it is possible to take legal action. These boundaries are arbitrarily set and
should be expected to vary between different types of corporations. |
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'Creditor fraud':
Illegal and litigationable 'pumping' of book value |
Firms that make less than ordinary profits have an
incentive to hide their problems by pumping up their book values and
earnings. Poorly performing firms may in particular be afraid of the
creditors’ reaction. For instance, if credits are frozen the firm would
almost certainly bankrupt. However, they may also try to hide their true
financial situation from suppliers that most likely would start to require
payments in advance if they heard of serious financial problems. Furthermore,
potential customers could be lost if they heard that it was uncertain that
the company would be around to finish or service deliveries. A special but
potentially very damaging incidence of value pumping is the situation of
substantial ownership by a financial institution of other non-financial
corporations. Such ownership constellations are prohibited in most western
countries, because a troubled financial institution could abuse its ownership
power to order a pumping of book values in order to avoid being unable to
fulfill its reserve requirements. |
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'Tax fraud':
Illegal and litigationable 'shrinking' of book value |
Every firm has an incentive to understate its earnings and
book values, because it can defer tax payments by doing so. This is one of
the key reasons that tax accounting often is governed by an entirely
different set of rules and conventions than the ordinary public financial
account. |
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- Copyright 1997-2008, ViamInvest. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Legal notice. |
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