Ownership structures

Introduction: This page is the main page for information about ownership structures. These structures are of major importance in corporate governance because they affect the incentives of managers and thereby the efficiency of the firm. The ownership structure is defined by the distribution of equity with regard to votes and capital but also by the identity of the equity owners. A classic reference is Jensen and Meckling [1976]. An excellent new reference is Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan [1999].

Content

General section

Table: Effects of ownership structures on corporate performance and other other kinds of institutions of relevance for corporate governance.
Table: International corporate governance - Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical state of large firm ownership structures in various countries as of 1980-95: 1) Developing countries. 2) Germany. 3) Japan. 4) Anglo-American countries. 5) Denmark.
Table: The corporate property rights.
Exhibition: Kinds of ownership structures in large firms.
Exhibition: Key agency relations and ownership by the financial sector.
Exhibition: The history of ownership in large enterprises.
Exhibition: A review of the theory on managerial ownership and financial performance.
Exhibition: The Morck et al. [1988] argument about incentives and managerial entrenchment.
Statistical model: The relation between managerial ownership and financial performance.

Special section on empirical studies

Table: Managerial ownership and performance - Empirical studies.
Table: Empirical studies on ownership structure and performance.