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Table:
International corporate governance - Tentative characterizations of legal and
empirical state of large firm bankruptcy systems
in various countries as of 1980-1995: Introduction: Some of the characterizations can be
found in Shleifer and Vishny [1996, pages 49-55]. Precautionary statement:
The first version of this table was primarily made out of memory and consequently
it lacks adequate references and may contain errors about the actual legal
and empirical state of the different institutions. As time passes more
references will be added. |
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Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical
state of large firm bankruptcy systems in developing countries as of
1980-1995 |
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A) Laws that protect creditors. |
Legal state:
Not accounted. Empirical state: Bankruptcies seems to be more common than in other kinds of governance
systems, probably caused by the higher degree of economic instability in developing
countries rather that flaws in the bankruptcy system. |
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Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical
state of large firm bankruptcy systems in |
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A) Laws that protect creditors. |
Legal state:
Tougher regulation. No chapter 11 protects the management and the owners from
the creditors. Empirical state: Large firms are seldom bankrupted. However, if thing goes very wrong
the large institutional investors often take temporary control in order to
restructure the firm and possibly replace the management. |
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Tentative characterizations of
legal and empirical state of large firm bankruptcy systems in |
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A) Laws that protect creditors. |
Legal state:
Softer regulation: E.g. managers and owners are protected against creditors
by ‘chapter 11’ like regulation. Empirical state: Large firms are observed to go into ‘chapter 11’ like protection but
it is very seldom that they bankrupt entirely. |
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Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical
state of large firm bankruptcy systems in Anglo-American
countries as of 1980-1995 |
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A) Laws that protect creditors. |
Legal state:
Softer regulation: E.g. managers and owners are protected against creditors
by chapter 11 regulation. Empirical state: Large firms are observed to go into chapter 11 protection but it is
very seldom that they bankrupt entirely. |
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Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical
state of large firm bankruptcy systems in |
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A) Laws that protect creditors. |
Legal state:
Tougher regulation. No chapter 11 protects the management and the owners from
the creditors. Empirical state: Large firms are seldom bankrupted. However, if thing goes very wrong
the large institutional investors often take temporary control in order to
restructure the firm and possibly replace the management. |
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- Copyright 1997-2008, ViamInvest. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Legal notice. |
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