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Table:
International corporate governance - Tentative characterizations of legal and
empirical state of large firm market for
corporate control in various countries as of 1980-1995: Introduction: Some of the characterizations can be
found in Shleifer and Vishny [1996, pages 49-55]. Precautionary statement:
The first version of this table was primarily made out of memory and consequently
it lacks adequate references and may contain errors about the actual legal
and empirical state of the different institutions. As time passes more references
will be added. |
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Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical
state of large firm market for corporate control in developing countries
as of 1980-1995 |
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A) Laws influencing the
market for corporate control. |
Legal state:
Not accounted. Empirical state: Because most large firms are hold by families or governments this
market is inactive compared to the governance systems of more developed
countries. |
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Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical
state of large firm market for corporate
control in |
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A) Laws influencing the
market for corporate control. |
Legal state: Several
obstacles in the market for corporate control. Empirical state: The market for corporate control is very active, but this is not so
with regard to hostile takeovers. The reason is that it is practically
impossible to get around the large German investors. |
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Tentative characterizations of legal
and empirical state of large firm market for corporate control in |
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A) Laws influencing the
market for corporate control. |
Legal state:
Several obstacles in the market for corporate control. Empirical state: The market for corporate control is very active, but this is not so
with regard to hostile takeovers. The reason is that it is practically
impossible to get around the large Japanese investors. |
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Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical
state of large firm market for corporate control
in Anglo-American countries as of 1980-1995 |
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A) Laws influencing the
market for corporate control. |
Legal state:
Few obstacles in the market for corporate control. Empirical state: The market for corporate control is very active, and indeed the most
active in the world with regard to hostile takeovers. |
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Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical
state of large firm market for corporate
control in |
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A) Laws influencing the
market for corporate control. |
Legal state:
Several obstacles in the market for corporate control. Empirical state: The market for corporate control is very active, but this is not so
with regard to hostile takeovers. The reason is that it is practically
impossible to get around the large German investors. |
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- Copyright 1997-2008, ViamInvest. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Legal notice. |
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